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BRIAN M. BARNARD 
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Salt Lake City Utah 
Attorney for D~fendant­
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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Appellant 
F 
--·-··-------
Cl,'):'.'., S'-'.-. -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDF.X 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
RELIEF SOUGHT. . 
POINT 1: 
THE LOWER COURT'S MODIFICATION ORDER IS 
BASED ON A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW RESULTING 
IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND REPRESENTS A 
Page 
2 
1 
1 
3 
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION . • . • . • . • • • 5 
POINT 2: 
DEFENDANT MAY NOT BENEFIT FROM PLAINTIFF'S 
INDUSTRY IN HER EFFORTS 'IO SUPPORT HERSELF 
AND THE CHILDREN. . • . • • . • • . . . • • 5 
POINT 3: 
THE LOWER COURT'S ALLOWANCE 'IO DEFENDANT 
OF ONE DEDUCTION FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES 
WAS WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE, 
AND CONTRARY 'IO THE COURT'S OWN FINDINGS 
OF FACT . • . . . • . • • • • 
CASES CI'IED 
Callister -vs- Callister, 1 Ut.2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 
Gamblin -vs- Gamblin, (Ky) 354 SW2d 504 .••. 
Germer -vs- Germer, 17 Ut.2d 393, 412 P2d 922. 
Harris -vs- Harris, 14 Ut.2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007 
Heltman -vs- Heltman, 29 Ut.2d 444, 511 P.2d 720 
Holbrook -vs- Holbrook, (Utah) 308 P.2d 1113 
King -vs- King, 25 Ut.2d 163, 478 P2d 492 
Osmus -vs- Osmus, (Utah) 198 P.2d 233. 
Scott -vs- Scott, (Utah) 142 P2d 198 . 
OTHER AU'IHORI'IY 
24 Am. Jr. 2d, Divorce, Sec. 849 · • . . . . . . . . . 
6 
4 
4 
4. 
4 
4 
6 
5 
6 
5 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOPE H. OPENSHAW (WALLACE), 
Plain~iff-Appellant 
-vs-
RICHARD CREED OPENSHAW, 
Defendant-Respondent 
CASE NO. 17369 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent petitioned below for a Modification 
of the Support and Income Tax Deduction Provisions of a Divorce 
Decree. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge, granted 
Defendant a reduction in the support requirements for his two 
sons, and allowed Defendant one child as a deduction for tax 
purposes, 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of 
Modification and re-instatement of the Divorce Decree Pro-
visions, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
STATE~ENT OF FACTS 
The parties are referred to as they appeare1 below. 
As evidenced by the Transcript herein, the "Heart~· 
of Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree was limited by the , 
Honorable Judge Rigtrup to an informal conference with the 
Attorneys, followed by a reported argument of Counsel, wi~fu 
parties present. No sworn testimony was taken. 
The only evidence was the introduction of a Monthly 
Expense and Income Statement from each party. Based on the 
foregoing, Judge Rigtrup reduced Defendant's support obligation 
for his two minor sons, age 11 and 8 at the time the divorce 
Complaint was filed (September 20, 19 76 R-4) , and ages 15 and li 
at the Modification Hearing (March 14, 1980). 
The Defendant's income at the time of the Decree was 
$4 75. 00 take-home pay ( R-28, Par. 7, Findings of Fact). He was 
ordered to pay $100. 00 per child support until his income in· 
creased to $800.00 per month take-home, at which time he was 
ordered to pay $200.00 per child, or $400.00 per month. 
In October, 1978, Defendant secured I employment paying 
1 to Plaintiff's $1,209.46 net (R-73), but did not so report 
Attorney (required by the Decree (R-32, Par. ·t; I F. ) , and Plaint1 · 1 
secured a Judgment for support in arrears in the amount of ' 
$1200. 00 ( R-79 l, for the six months Defendant had secreted his 
income from Plaintiff. 
I 
The Plaintiff was awarded $1. 00 per year alimony in the I 
Decree. She had not worked outside the home for several years l 
and was therefore forced to seek 
maintain a home for the children 
and secure employment to ... it!. I 
( R-12 - Plaintiff's Affid:J 
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She worked her way up the ladder by securing employment, through 
successive employers, until at the time of the Modification 
Hearing, she was employed by a medical clinic (Answers to 
Interrogatories R-69). 
Although the Defendant was ordered in the Decree to 
hold Plaintiff harmless from a Third Mortgage on her home to 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co, (R-32 Pag. D), she was forced 
to sell that home to avoid foreclosure proceedings by them 
(R-70, Pag. 10, Answers to Interrogatories). As a result of 
Defendant's failure to so hold her harmless, Plaintiff was re-
quired to secure another dwelling, with increased monthly pay-
ments. 
The Defendant had re-married and assigned his increased 
expenses of that marriage, including the costs of support for a 
step-daughter, as the change of circumstances entitling him to a 
reduction in support, with which the Honorable Judge Rigtrup agreed. 
Plaintiff's Motions for Amendment for Modification Order 
(Rule 52 (b), to open the Judgment for a formal hearing (Rule 59 
(e), and for relief from the Modification Order (Rule 60 (b), 
after oral argument, were denied, excepting that the Court's Order 
granting Defendant both children as income tax deductions, was 
amended to one deduction for each party. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE LOWER COURT'S MODIFICATION ORDER IS BASED 
ON A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW RESULTING IN PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR AND REPRESENTS A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
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We have searched in vain for a precedent where any 
Court has upheld a reduction in support payments on the groun~s 
of circumstances based on the father's re-marriage, plus 
his three-fold increase in income. 
2 4 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce, Sec. 8 49-Remarr iage of Parent. 
"'Ihe fact that the father has remarried, thus 
increasing his expenses, is not a ground in itself 
for reducing child support .... " 
In the Annotation is a quote from Gamblin -vs- Gamblin 
(Ky) 354 SW 2d 504: 
"A father's first duty is tl'e support of 
his children. 'Ihey are ~be given preference 
over new automobiles and new wives." 
But we need not go to other jurisdictions as this Court 
has consistently followed the above rule. 
Garmer -vs- Garmer (66) 17 Ut.2d 393, 412 P.2d 922, 
this Court refused to reduce support payments where the father 
had re-married and had two children by that marriage. 
Heltman -vs- Heltman, 29 Ut.2d 444, 511 P.2d 720 ~a~ 
holds that re-marriage, and the additional financial burden, doe 
not qualify as a change of circumstances. 
Harris -vs- Harris (1963) 14 Ut.2d 96, 377 P.2dl007, 
this Court states at P2d 1010: 
"We deem it appropriate to observe that the 
various excuses offered by the Defendant for failure 
to contribute to the support of his children; that ~~e 
has remarried and has numerous expenses, including 
operation of a car; the repayment of a loan to his 
sister· his clothing laundry and barber expenses, 
' ' than however necessary they may be, are not more. so bl 
the needs of his children· and were to considera~ 
extent taken on subsequent to that responsibilit.1.:." 
!Emphasis added.) 
Callister -vs- Callister (1953) 1 Ut.2d 34, 261 
9 4 4 , at Pg . 9 4 9 : 
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"Plaintiff's Counsel (asserts) that voluntary 
impoverishment is not a ground for reduction in 
alimony. With the latter statement we agree. 
Scott -vs- Scott (1943) 142 Pac. 2d 198, this Court 
refused to accept, as a change of circumstances, the fact that 
the Defendant had remarried, and had a child by that marriage 
as well as stepchildren to support. 
King -vs- King (1970) 25 Ut.2d 163, 478 P2d 492, 
wherein the Defendant had remarried a woman with four children, 
this Court states: 
"It is not disputed that this taking on of 
a new family obligation is subordinate to his 
prior obligation to the Plain tiff." 
In the case at bar, the Defendant, at the time of the 
divorce, anticipated that his earnings would increase. They did. 
The Decree, to which he had previously stipulated, provided that 
he would pay support for his two children of $200.00 per child 
when his take-home earnings reached $800.00. He voluntarily 
remarried, and attempted to place his "new family" above his 
obligation to his sons, and became $1.200 delinquent in support 
payments, for which Judgment was rendered. 
The Lower Court erred as a matter of law, in granting 
a modification in favor of Defendant. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT MAY NOT BENEFIT FROM PLAINTIFF'S 
INDUSTRY IN HER EFFORTS TO SUPPORT HERSELF AND 
THE CHILDREN. 
Plaintiff, who was age 50 at the time of the divorce, 
and had not been employed during the marriage of 17 years, 
deserves considerable credit for seeking and securing employ-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and T chnology Act, admini t red by the Utah State Library. 
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$900.00 at the time of the Modification "Hearing". Her t>ke-
home pay, however, was a meager $769.00. (R-64,78) 
Judge Rigtrup disallowed as a deduction, however, the 
$10. 00 per pay period for savings -- and this, despite the fac: 
that she had no alimony, no social security, or retirement 
benefits built up from the marriage. 
Osmus -vs- Osmus (1948) 198 P.2d 233, this Court states 
at Page 235. 
"The fact that Plaintiff received $5,000.00 
for the equity in the home did not excuse the Defendant: 
from complying with the order of the court. The ex-
istence of independent means might be a factor to ~ 
considered by the court in fixing alimony, or in 
considering a petition for modification of a decree, 
or perhaps, under certain circumstances, in mi tigatior. 
of punishment for contempt. But no discretion is left, 
to a divorced husband, to determine whether he should 
or will comply with an alimony decree. So long as sue:•, 
decree stands, it is incumbent upon him to comply with I 
it, or at least to exercise every reasonable effort to 
comply with it. If because of change in the circum-
stances of the parties it appears that the decree is 
inequitable, or impossible to comply with, he may 
petition for modification. But so long as that decree 
stands, the husband must comply with it, or make evefj', 
reasonable effort to do so, and this is true reoadlesi; 
of how the financial situation of his former wife m~ (' 
have improved. 
In Holbrook -vs- Holbrook (Utah) 308 P.2d lll3, this 
Court States at (Pg. 1115): 
"It would seem strange to permit the husband 
and father to force her into such a situation, then 
take advantage of it to escape his liabilities with-
out some change for the worse in his ability 10 meet 
his obligations." (Emphasis added) 
POINT THREE 
THE LOWER COURTS ALLOWANCE TO DEFENDANT OF ONE 
DEDUCTION FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES, WAS WITHOUT AITT 
BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S 
I 
OWN FINDINGS OF FAC~T~·~~~~~~._,.. ............. 1111111 
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Paragraph 4 of the Findings states: (R-88) 
'"The Plaintiff's current monthly expenses 
for her support and that of the two minor children 
of the parties is $896.35." 
Paragraph 7 further finds: 
"The sum of $175.00 per month per child, 
plus maintaining health and accident insurance 
for the minor children, plus paying for drugs 
and medication for the minor child, Thomas, con-
stitutes more than 50% of the necessary monthly 
support for the minor children." 
There was no sworn testimony, or any other evidence 
as to the cost of the insurance, or the amount paid for drugs 
and medication, and the Lower Court made those Findings without 
any evidence whatsoever. Aside from that, the Court's Findings 
in Paragraph 7, is not supported by simple arithmetic. 
Certainly, it is only logical and equitable to find 
that if the Plaintiff must pay $900.00 per month to maintain a 
home for herself and two children, plus utilities, food, clothing, 
and the like, that one-third of that sum should be allocated to 
each, or $300.00 per child. That, obviously, is double the 
amount the Court found exceeded 50% of the monthly support for 
each child. 
CONCLUSION 
The Modification Order, reducing child support payments, 
should be reversed, and the terms of the Decree reinstated. 
The Order allowing one deduction to Defendant for 
income tax purposes should also be reversed, and the provisions 
of the Decree, as amended, allowing Plaintiff both deductions 
should also be reinstated . 
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I/ 
320 South 
Salt Lake 
300 East ! 
Cit Y, Utah 84111 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to ! 
Brian M. Barnard, Defendant-Respondent's Counsel, 214 Easts~ 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, thisb-.::;day of January, 
1981. 
Attorney for Pl 
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